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ABSTRACT. The paper analyses the "advertising as power" vs. "advertising as 
information" controversy as well as its recent empirical testing. It is stressed that this 
distinction focuses too much on the interaction between consumer and manufacturer 
while ignoring the retailer as an important stake-holder. To compensate for this 
lack, a complex marketing system perspective is introduced in which consumer, 
retailer, and manufacturer interact. However, these complex marketing systems 
might drift towards market equilibria which are against he consumer interests: that 
is, firms might lock out brands from the market by means of trade and sales 
promotions and then use advertising to protect heir position. Consequently brands 
of better quality and/or innovative brands are barred from trade shelves. 
The relationship between advertising and product quality and their 
linkage to market structures have recently become the focus of atten- 
tion for two reasons: (a) we have witnessed a renewed interest in 
product quality from academics as well as manufacturers and (b) the 
productivity of advertising continues to attract he attention of many 
major media, for example US News and World Report (Allman, 
1989) and The New York Times (Rothenberg, 1989). 
This paper will first elucidate the controversy concerning the 
relationship between quality and advertising. This controversy began 
when two theories about advertising and market structure merged: 
The first theory saw advertising as information (Nelson, 1970) and 
the second saw advertising as power (Comanor & Wilson, 1974). 
Next, an empirical test of both models by Tellis and Fornell (1988) 
will be analysed. Some deficiencies of this empirical study will be 
discussed and an alternative theoretical model which borrows from 
"complex systems theory" will be presented. This new model, so I 
suggest, can serve as a framework for discussing consumer policy 
issues as regards advertising. 
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THE THEORIES 
Willem Verbeke 
Advertising as Information 
In his discussion of the relationship between advertising and product 
quality, Nelson (1970, 1974) introduces two main theses concerning 
consumer behaviour: 
1. Advertising essentially informs consumers about product attri- 
butes, but does not change the way consumers value those attributes. 
2. Over time, consumers become more price sensitive and sub- 
sequently buy best "value." The relationship between price and 
quality, as assessed by consumers, in particular affects the elasticity 
of a given product. 
It is because the consumer is able to evaluate product quality that 
certain dynamics will develop in markets. Two specific dynamic 
processes are generated: 
1. Better informed consumers pressure firms to lower prices and 
improve quality. Firms able to improve product quality can enter the 
market. 
2. Over the product's life cycle, industry prices will decrease; 
profits are affected by increased competition; the effect on profits 
resulting from increased efficiency isambiguous. 
As a result of these dynamics, a specific market structure sub- 
sequently emerges: Entry into a market is always possible because 
firms can produce innovative product attributes and communicate 
these to consumers, which will intensify the competition. Within an 
industry, only efficient firms will survive. Inefficient firms will be 
replaced by the innovative ntrants. 
Nelson's point of view has also been suppested by Akerlof (1970) 
who claims that branding of goods (in which advertising plays a 
crucial role) signalises quality, thus reducing consumer uncertainty 
about quality. The brand becomes a signal because consumers know 
that brands which do not meet the consumer expectations (called 
lemons) have been, or should have been, eliminated. 
Advertising and Market Power 
The theory of Comanor and Wilson (1974) is based upon other 
presumptions concerning consumer behaviour: 
1. Advertising affects consumer preferences and tastes, changes 
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product attributes, and differentiates the product from competitive 
offerings. 
2. Consumers become brand loyal because of advertising and, as 
a result, become less price sensitive, thus perceiving fewer substitutes 
for advertised brands. 
Market dynamics are affected by this consumer behaviour in three 
ways: 
1. Firms can charge higher prices and are not as likely to 
compete with quality or price. 
2. hmovation within firms may be reduced. 
3. High prices and excessive profits might accrue to firms which 
sell advertised but low quality products, giving them even more 
incentive to advertise their products. 
These changes in market dynamics generate a market structure in 
which potential entrants must overcome established brand loyalty 
and spend relatively more on advertising. Consequently, established 
firms can insulate themselves from market competition by outspend- 
ing rivals, both present and potential. As a result, few firms will 
dominate the industry, leaving them with much discretionary power. 
Comanor and Wilson's picture of how advertising works is just 
the opposite of Nelson's. In their view, firms are able to sell products 
of lower quality because advertising develops brand loyalty. Con- 
sequently, when firms sell more and also earn more by making 
consumers less price sensitive, they will invest in advertising rather 
than in product improvement or innovation (a thesis which Nelson 
seems to reject, as he states that innovation is the central source of 
changes in the marketplace). Furthermore, firms with products of 
better quality may be unable to enter the market because they cannot 
afford the advertising needed to overcome the existing brand loyalty. 
An Assessment of the Two Theories 
-- The authors of both theories concentrate on only a small per- 
centage of marketing communications; they do not mention other 
communication tools, such as sales and trade promotions. Currently, 
advertising represents only 30% of the marketing communication 
budgets while trade promotion represents 40% and sales promotion 
30% (Farris & Quelch, 1987). 
- -  Neither theory mentions the emerging power of the retailing 
trade (a subject which will be discussed below). In other words, their 
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proponents exclusively study the direct effects of advertising on 
consumer buying behaviour. This method of analysis is called "single 
stage modelling" (Steiner, 1978). 
-- The direct and indirect effects of advertising on traders are 
crucial in determining profits. Advertising results in a reduction of 
the trade's margin (because retailers engage in interstore competition 
and the price of salient brands subsequently drop), but the margin of 
the manufacturer remains unaffected. The profits which then emerge 
can and will be used for product innovations. This observation is not 
consistent with the statement of Comanor and Wilson that firms 
must constantly invest in advertising to secure their market share. 
- -  It is difficult to describe advertising by means of the budget 
only. Creativity and quality of advertising copy play a role as well, 
and neither Nelson nor Comanor and Wilson seem to address this 
issue. 
-- Although both theories describe how firms bring brands onto 
the market, these descriptions are somewhat superficial. Most firms 
bring a portfolio of brands to the marketplace with some brands 
serving as cash cows to support he newly introduced brands. Firms 
which buy advertising for a brand portfolio also benefit from 
economies of scale. While Comanor and Wilson state that firms with 
a high market share will invest more in advertising than their com- 
petitors, they do not mention that this may also be attributable to the 
economies of scale. It is economies of scale (and the profits gener- 
ated because of the high margins) that allow firms to invest more 
money in product development and innovation. Nelson's theory, too, 
seems to ignore these effects. 
- -  Nelson states that advertising does not change consumer per- 
ceptions of the brand. However, firms develop brand portfolios 
based on positioning strategies which are amplified by advertising 
campaigns and which give rise to specific images in the consumer's 
mind (Wind, 1982). 
- -  Nelson argues that advertising informs consumers. However, 
already in 1971, Morris proved that neither the company's nor the 
brand's image can be regarded as a valid and reliable indicator of 
quality and price (whereas comparative product testing provides 
more though not totally accurate indicators of quality). 
I am in full agreement with Tellis and Fornell (1988) that these 
two theoretical models, which supposedly set out to explain the 
occurrence of advertising, include many unsubstantiated assumptions 
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that themselves have contributed to the controversy about the role of 
advertising in consumer behavior. For instance, it has not been 
substantiated that advertising makes people brand loyal (as Comanor 
and Wilson state); nor has it been substantiated that advertising fails 
to change people's perceptions of brands (as Nelson states). I will 
now describe the way in which Tellis and Fornell seek to verify the 
above-mentioned models empirically. 
The Empirical Test of the Advertising Controversy 
Tellis and Fornell (1988) begin by introducing operational defini- 
tions of the terms used in the two models. They then introduce two 
new aspects of consumer behaviour, thus expanding the possible 
dynamics which advertising can initiate within markets. These 
dynamics can be described as follows: 
1. Over time, consumers can be (and are) informed about 
product quality from different sources, such as mouth-to-mouth 
communication, personal experience, consumer groups, and con- 
sumer magazines. 
2. Improved product quality is not necessarily related to higher 
costs in the beginning of the product life cycle since the firm might 
have in-house expertise which allows it to enter a new market 
without heavy investment. 
After introducing these ideas, Tellis and Fornell then reformulate 
the two paradigms mentioned earlier. Nelson's "advertising is infor- 
mation" theory is now viewed as a theory about efficient market 
structures. Comanor and Wilson's "advertising is power" is now 
perceived as a theory about perverse market structures. 
Advertising and efficient markets. This scenario postulates that some 
firms, already experienced in marketing similar products or possess- 
ing established know-how, can enter new markets relatively easily. It 
also assumes that consumers are reasonably well informed about 
quality and are willing to pay more for better quality; hence firms 
with brands of higher quality will attract a larger market. Assuming 
this is true, companies with higher quality brands will be motivated 
to increase advertising. Therefore, higher quality will lead to higher 
levels of advertising, market share, and profit. 
Advertising and perverse markets. In this scenario it is costly, at least 
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for some firms, to produce quality products. Furthermore, if con- 
surners are not informed about quality or are unable to recognize it, 
they will not pay for it. As a result, consumers are more responsive 
to advertising. Given this scenario, firms producing low quality 
brands will succeed by advertising heavily and will, by investing in 
advertising but not in product quality, force the quality producers 
out of the market. Lower quality products (lemons) and increased 
advertising will result. 
Tellis and Fornell (1988) have tested both scenarios using a 
product life cycle (PLC) approximation. They hypothesize that 
markets may behave in a perverse manner in the beginning of the 
PLC, but will become more efficient over time. In the beginning of 
the PLC, consumers have not yet formed an opinion of the product. 
Consequently, consumers will respond less intelligently to advertising 
(advertising works perversely). At the end of the PLC, consumers 
will be better informed about product quality (which makes them 
less responsive to advertising) and, because firms are able to 
produce quality more efficiently, markets will be more competitive. 
Using the PIMS data base, Tellis and Fornell (1988) indeed verify 
that markets become more efficient over time: "Public policy makers 
need not be greatly concerned by advertisers' expenditures per se for 
overall consumer welfare. Markets in the aggregate appear fairly 
competitive, as the positive rewards to quality indicate" (p. 70). 
THE RETAILER AS A MARKETING STAKE-HOLDER, OR THE NEED 
FOR DUAL-STAGE MODELS 
As mentioned above, Tellis and Fornell expanded the quality versus 
advertising discussion by arguing that consumers are able to recog- 
nize product quality and that firms in some instances are able to 
produce high quality products at relatively low costs -- dynamics 
which would result in efficient markets. Tellis and Fornell's model 
must also be classified as a single-stage model however, since it does 
not deal with the behaviour of the retailer. Nowadays, most scholars 
agree that single-stage models are incomplete Since the retailer has 
become acrucial stake-holder substantially affecting market dynamics 
(Farris, Olver, & DeKluyver, 1989). The retailer is a powerful 
marketing stake-holder for the following reasons: 
1. Shelf space, owned by the retailer, may be an even more 
important factor than modern marketing techniques, shelf space 
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being the more limited resource. Current brand extensions only add 
to this problem. 
2. By becoming heavily concentrated, the retailing trade strength- 
ened its bargaining power. This phenomenon explains rising manu- 
facturer expenditures on trade promotions. 
3. The retailing trade learned to improve their shelf space 
management by means of new techniques, such as the DPP (Direct 
Product Profitability) and DPC (Direct Product Costs) models. This 
gave the trade increased power during negotiations with the manu- 
facturers. 
These trends spurred scholars to develop dual-stage models in 
which there are interactions between consumer, retailer, and manu- 
facturer. The following studies can be characterized as dual-stage 
models. 
Farris et al. (1989) showed that brands that obtain an advantage 
in the beginning of the PLC (perhaps due to trade marketing efforts) 
regularly obtain better distribution and higher market share over 
time. The trade adopts and keeps brands with higher turnover (DPP 
and DPC models show that brands with a high turnover are cost effi- 
cient for the trade). Brands which sell well initially, will generate 
advertising funds which help increase further sales and secure their 
place on the shelves. Farris and Reibstein (1984) described this 
phenomenon as follows: "Changes in advertising can cause changes 
in distribution; changes in demand can cause changes in distribution; 
and changes in distribution can change sales" (p. 33). A former 
manager of a fast moving multinational company made the following 
observation: "to come back to your question . . .  about buying shelf 
space: we simply bought shelf space. Rest the question what perfect 
competitive markets really mean" (de Soet, 1989, p. 6). Numerous 
studies show that when adopting new products, established firms 
have an advantage over others (Gupta, 1988). 
Firms with brands which are established in the stores will also 
practise account management and relationship management. That is, 
they will invest in establishing a good relationship with the retailer 
and when competitors introduce a new product hey will imitate the 
new product and preempt shelf space (Heeler, Kearney, & Mehaffey, 
1973). 
Although consumers do evaluate brands, this evaluation does 
depend on context. As many scholars have observed, store loyalty is 
frequently due to advantageous location and convenience (Carman, 
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1970; Farris et al., 1961; Kuehn, 1961). Consequently, consumers 
choose among brands available at that store. Other studies how that 
consumers barely remember prices (prices change too often) and 
perceive a brand as price reduced when placed on display (even 
when the price has actually not been reduced) (Dickson & Sawyer, 
1990). Furthermore, studies in connectionistic psychology (Smolen- 
sky, 1988) show convincingly that consumers are input sensitive, 
which implies that their perceptions of brands fluctuate constantly 
depending on the context (also called "impulsive" buying). 
The PIMS data base, which Tellis and Fornell have been using, 
has an inherent bias: Firms forced out of the market or unable to 
enter the market due to limited shelf space even though they may 
produce higher quality products, are not included in the data base 
since the data base includes only firms that have survived. 
To achieve increased bargaining power with manufacturers, the 
retailers are merging. As a consequence, manufacturers are also 
merging. This reciprocal merging process explains the concentrations 
within industries, Comanor and Wilson have noted, in a different 
way. The mechanisms of retailer intervention in the market are not 
mentioned by Nelson, Comanor and Wilson, or Tellis and Fornell, 
which indicates that the retailer has not been perceived as an impor- 
tant marketing stake-holder. Now we will explore dual-stage frame- 
works which include the behaviour of the retailer. With both the 
retailer, the consumer, and the manufacturer participating, the 
opportunities for interactions increase significantly. Complex systems 
theory becomes essential for explaining why certain interactions are 
dominant. 
ADVERTISING AND COMPLEX MARKETING SYSTEMS 
I now want to introduce the hypothesis that understanding of the 
retailing trade becomes crucial because it conditions market dy- 
namics. When the retailer, the consumer, and the manufacturer 
interact, a business system emerges. The initial conditions of a 
system, combined with early random events or fluctuations, act to 
push the system into an asymptotic state. In other words, a possible 
equilibrium state is selected which the system locks into (Nicofis & 
Prigogine, 1989). This phenomenon, also called positive feedback, 
plays a creative or self-organising role within complex systems. By 
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the same token, small changes may destabilise the system, after 
which it may settle into a state of equilibrium that is qualitatively 
different. As Arthur (1988, 1990) points out, economic development 
could well be modeled from a complex systems theory perspective. 
In this perspective, the economy is characterised by: 
1. Multiple equilibria whose outcome is not uniquely predictable 
(also called an "open future"). 
2. Possible inefficient economic equilibria. Some technologies, 
firms, products, or brands may simply have bad luck in the beginning 
of the PLC and might subsequently fail to make it in the market. 
3. Once achieved, it may be difficult o exit from equilibria. 
4. Systems vulnerability. That is, innovations or changes in one of 
the stake-holders may destroy the system's equilibrium. That is why 
firms must proactively respond to these changes. In other words, the 
system is constantly recreating itself (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989). 
Arthur's example of the VHS and Beta case is illuminating. In the 
beginning of the PLC, Beta and VHS both competed for market 
dominance. However, a small lead in the market share gained by one 
of the technologies could enhance its competitive position and help it 
to increase its lead. For instance, because VHS was found in more 
video stores, more VHS recorders were bought. Increased VHS 
recorder sales led to increased VHS tape sales, thus creating a self- 
reinforcing process that eventually captured 100% of the market. 
This phenomenon is called positive feedback. Arthur argues that this 
process could be called coordination: As a product obtains high 
distribution, consumers most likely will choose among these pro- 
ducts so distributed. This self-reinforcing mechanism is important for 
marketing and confirms the previous argument about he crucial role 
the retailer plays in markets. While consumers acted quite rationally 
in the video recorder scenario (they bought videos and recorders 
which were easily obtained and of satisfactory quality), other manu- 
facturers were forced to produce recorders using the VHS standard. 
Consequently, since most experts agreed that Beta was of better 
quality, the total market did not evolve into its most efficient state. 
This self-organising process, by means of which a total market drifts 
into an inefficient equilibrium, is called "competition as collusion" by 
Hirschman (1970). In short, complex systems theory emphasises the 
self-organising process which might lead to various equilibria states, 
states which are not necessarily the most efficient ones from the 
consumer's point of view. 
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The Beta and VHS case which was used to exemplify a complex 
systems perspective is a case at the product standard level, not at the 
brand or firm level. Nevertheless, Arthur's case is an interesting 
example, because it illustrates the self-organising process within the 
market and how market inefficiencies might occur. Below, I will 
concentrate mainly on how firms might lock out other firms (and 
their brands and innovations) from markets by means of marketing 
communication, with resulting inefficiencies from the consumer's 
point of view. 
Before I continue, two aspects are now recapitulated: 
1. In the criticised theories, too few marketing stake-holders were 
included, thus setting a limit to the number of possible end states or 
equilibria. 
2. Manufacturers merge because retailers merge and vice versa. 
Subsequently, fewer firms are marketing more brands thus allowing 
them to obtain economies of scale and other benefits. 
From the complex systems perspective, successful firms gain 
market share because they are able to co-ordinate the marketing 
stake-holders (consumers, retailers, and competitors), thus reducing 
for some time the degrees of freedom within a market. In marketing, 
this coordination process is called "environmental shaping" (Savitt, 
1987). Manufacturers will offer brands that fit the consumer needs 
(to a certain degree) while trying to keep competitors out of the 
market by limiting their shelf space. Manufacturers create this sort of 
environment with advertising (and other commtmication tools). But 
as we will see, this new environment generates dynamics which not 
only lock up a system (through entry barriers) but also create 
instabilities. The main components of this complex systems perspec- 
tive can be described in the following way: 
-- Manufacturers who have established a good relationship with 
retailers have a competitive advantage in the beginning of the PLC 
when markets have not yet reached an equilibrium. These same firms 
also use their advertising budget (actual as well as projected) to 
assure adoption of their brand by the trade (Farris & Reibstein, 
1984). Furthermore, their advertising campaigns create consumer 
preferences which reinforce their security (see Figure 1). 
-- When consumers buy a product, these same consumers become 
more sensitive to the brand's advertising. As they become more 
sensitive to the advertising, increased buying results, which then 
leads to a higher market share (Tellis, 1988) thus positively influenc- 
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Fig. 1. The effects of advertising on retailers and consumers. 
ing the adoption by the trade. Notice that where Comanor and 
Wilson suggest hat consumers become brand loyal, it is now 
suggested that consumers become more sensitive to the advertising 
of their chosen brands (advertising prone) which results in more 
buying. 
-- When brands become more popular or salient, stores reduce 
their prices (called interstore competition) (Albion, 1983). This 
lowering of prices further increases the sale of the brand, thus 
making leaders tronger. However, this mechanism also reduces the 
margin of the retailers who, in reaction, might introduce their own 
brands (called private brands). This new marketing ame reduces 
competition within an industry because it reduces helf space avail- 
able to the manufacturers. In other words, the marketing enerates 
new dynamics. 
-- The retailer is also active in: (a) positioning himself as a high 
quality purveyor or as a discounter (which subsequently affects 
which brands will be adopted); (b) proactively introducing his own 
innovative brands. In fact, retailers are the biggest advertisers, at 
least in Europe. These trade activities also lead to new dynamics in 
the markets. 
- -  Last but not least, the consumer (tastes, buying patterns, etc.) 
is changing too. The retailer as well as the manufacturer will respond 
to these changes ex post as well as ex ante. These reactions also 
generate instabilities inthe current system. 
154 Willem Verbeke 
I have just explained how the behaviour of the various marketing 
stake-holders might inject instabilities into the system which, ampli- 
fied over time, may lead to new temporarily stable equilibria. In 
other words, the system renews itself constantly. These mechanisms 
might, in some cases, create inefficiencies in markets (which the 
VHS case illustrates). The highest quality products will not always 
reach the consumer, either because the trade has not adopted the 
best quality brand, or because other firms have tilted the market o 
an equilibrium unfavourable to products of higher quality. It must be 
mentioned, however, that these scenarios, while possible, are not 
inevitable. 
THE ADVERTISING AND QUALITY DISCUSSION FROM THE SYSTEMS 
PERSPECTIVE 
An outline has just been given of how various market stake-holders 
can generate new dynamics within markets. Complex systems theory 
shows how markets might equilibrate and how they might transform 
themselves over time. Now it is possible to take another look at the 
earlier discussion on advertising and quality. 
The dynamics which Comanor and Wilson have described are 
apparently too narrow. The high concentration of firms which occurs 
in many industries cannot be attributed solely to the consumers' 
brand loyalty but must also be attributed to positive feedback 
mechanisms which operate between the retailer, the consumer, and 
the manufacturer. Furthermore, concentration within an industry 
does not imply that innovation in product and quality ceases. As we 
just showed, because systems are unstable, innovation and improved 
quality are grounds for renewed competition. Even so, inefficiencies 
occur .  
Neither are Nelson's arguments exactly correct. The consumer 
might assess brands, but this evaluation process does not imply that 
the best brands will be retained. Some brands are simply not stocked 
by certain stores and therefore cannot be inspected. Furthermore, 
the so-called price dynamics, which consumers upposedly generate, 
are not really attributable to the consumer -- the trade also evokes 
interstore competition thus lowering the retail price. This pricing, 
however, need not affect the manufacturer and subsequently does 
not lead to the market efficiency that Nelson assumes. 
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The complex systems approach does not speak for Tellis and 
Fornell either. Their study did not really focus on the dynamics 
between retailer and manufacturer. As just mentioned, those dynamics 
might explain the higher profits of the manufacturer. Their study, 
based on PIMS data, did not include an investigation i to how firms 
can be locked out of the market because of limited shelf space. 
Briefly stated, the complex systems theory I have just described 
tells a different story of how quality, advertising, and market struc- 
tures relate to one another. In this story, more interactions are 
possible. Consequently, a more detailed picture is called for. 
COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND CONSUMER POLICY 
That markets might drift into inefficient equilibria due to the interac- 
tions between retailer, manufacturer, and consumer has implications 
for consumer policy. The following case is well-suited to illustrate 
these implications. 
In the Netherlands, the detergent market is a quasi-oligopolistic 
market dominated by three manufacturers. About five years ago a 
small Dutch firm invented the compact or condensed etergent. 
Although this innovation had benefits both for the consumer (a com- 
pact detergent takes up less room), for the environment ( he smaller 
packaging is environment-friendly), and for the trade (a compact 
detergent saves shelf space and thus hikes the DPP), once invented 
the compact detergent was not adopted because the reputation of 
this small firm as a strong brand builder was not good enough. Two 
years later, a Japanese firm introduced the compact detergent and 
before long all three major firms did likewise. The compact detergent 
was then quickly adopted by the retailers. Before long, the three 
main firms dominated the compact detergent segment. 
This case shows that while the innovation did reach the market, it 
became significantly delayed. In other words, the market dynamics of 
a concentrated market might postpone the adoption of innovations 
among consumers. Let us remember, however, that the opposite 
might also occur. In many cases, the ability of multinationals to 
innovate and to anticipate trends far exceed consumers' current 
tastes and perceptions. Nevertheless, let us stick to the situation with 
fast moving consumer products and with the inefficient equilibria 
which might be generated in such markets. 
156 Willem Verbeke 
Experts in the field of consumer affairs and consmner law I agree 
that these dynamics indeed might occur within consumer markets. 
Specifically, they point out that the introduction of ecologically 
responsible products might be delayed, in the same manner as some 
innovative products. Other examples are the non-exploitation of 
patented medical innovations and law suits that try to force the 
retailing trade to stop boycotting certain products (such as oranges 
from South Africa). However, the same experts uggest that it is not 
always desirable or possible to construct laws that can prohibit hese 
dynamics. The experts view it as difficult to urge retailers to take 
actions for which they must bear the risks. 
While it is true that legislative regulation of these dynamics is 
difficult, they have not gone unnoticed by consumer organisations. In
the past, for example, a certain presence in the market (a certain 
market share or distribution) has been a prerequisite for a firm to be 
selected for the "comparative product quality test" (see also Morris 
& Bronson, 1969). Now certain consumer groups (the Dutch Con- 
sumer's Union, for example) have expressed the opinion that this 
distribution or market share should be kept as low as possible. In 
other words, consumer groups are interested in evaluating products 
as soon as they enter the market. By doing so, they hope to affect he 
market already in the early stages of the PLC, thus avoiding undesir- 
able dynamics. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, reference was made to the traditional discussion 
between quality, advertising, and market structures. Then, in accord- 
ance with Tellis and ForneU, the discussion was expanded by intro- 
ducing further marketing stake-holders, specifically the retailing 
trade. In this perspective, market dynamics might generate quilibria 
that are contrary to consumers' interests. While it is difficult to 
implement laws that put an end to these dynamics, consumer groups 
could attempt to neutralise them. 
NOTE 
1 The author wishes to thank W. Slagter, R. Holzhauer, W. Dolman, and L. Bakker 
from the Erasmus University Rotterdam and T. Recter from the Dutch Consumer 
Association for discussions about hese issues. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Werbung, Produktqualitiit und komplexe Marketingsysteme. Der Beitrag behandelt 
die kontroverse Gegeniiberstellung von Werbung als Marktmacht und Werbung als 
Information, sowie einen neueren Versuch, diese Kontroverse mpirisch zu ent- 
scheiden. Der Autor betont, dab sich die Kontroverse zu stark anf die Interaktion 
zwischen Konsument und Hersteller konzentriert, w~trend er Handel als eigen- 
st~indig beteiligte Instanz iibersehen wird. Um diesen Mangel zu beheben, fiihrt er 
eine komplexere Perspektive des Marketingsystems ein, in welcher alle drei Instanzen 
interagieren. Die Analyse ergibt jedoch, dab sich solche komplexe Marketingsys- 
teme auf Gleichgewichte zubewegen k6nnen, die gegen das Konsumenteninteresse 
gerichtet sind. Unternehmen k6nnen Konkurrenten mit handelspofitischen Mabnah- 
men vom Markt femhalten trod dann ihre eigene Position mit Mitteln der Werbung 
schiitzen. Folgich k6nnen Marken besserer Qualit~it oder innovative Produktenwick- 
lungen vom Markt ferngehalten werden. 
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